Battle of Guningtou

Battle of Kinmen Battle of Kuningtou
Part of the Cross-Strait conflict
Today's Kinmen County, ROC (Taiwan) (red) off the coast of Mainland China (light grey), relative to the rest of Taiwan (dark gray, in inset). Greater Kinmen (Quemoy) is the largest red highlighted island.
Date 25 October 1949 - 27 October 1949 Location Kinmen County, Fukien (Hokkien) Province , Republic of China Today's Chinning Township, Greater Kinmen Island (Quemoy), Republic of China (Taiwan) Result Republic of China (Taiwan) victory
Belligerents
Republic of China (Taiwan)	People's Republic of China
Commanders and leaders
Chiang Kai-shek Tang En-Po Hu Lien Hiroshi Nemoto	Mao Tze-Tung Chen Yih Su Yü Yeh Fei
Strength
Roughly 40,000 garrisoned troops mainly from the ROC 18th Army, 22nd Army, 12th Army (more reinforcements arrived after the battle however) Air support from ROC Air Force Naval support from ROC Navy	19,000 infantry from PLA 29th Army Corps and the 244th, 246th, 251st, 253rd regiments from the PLA 28th Army Corps (Only 9,086 actually landed) 200 landing vessels (mostly confiscated fishing boats) Mainland artillery support
Casualties and losses
1,267 killed 1,982 wounded	3,873 killed 5,175 captured

The Battle of Kinmen (Chinese: 金門戰役), also known as the Battle of Kuningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭之役) or the Battle of Guningtou, was fought in October 1949 on the island of Kinmen (Quemoy), located in the Taiwan Strait, during the final stages of the Chinese Civil War.

The battle resulted in a decisive victory for the Nationalist forces and marked a significant turning point in the civil war. The Communist defeat not only preserved Kinmen under Nationalist control, but also effectively halted their plans to invade Taiwan, thereby ensuring the continued survival of the Nationalist government on the island.

Prelude

Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949, the government of the Republic of China (ROC) under Chiang Kai-shek began withdrawing its forces from mainland China to Taiwan. However, ROC garrisons remained stationed on the offshore islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and the Matsu archipelago, situated just off the coast of Hokkien Province. Commanders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) viewed Kinmen and Matsu as strategically necessary stepping stones before any potential operation against Taiwan island itself.

In early July 1949, the PLA began invading Hokkien under the command of the 10th Army Group of the Third Field Army, led by General Yeh Fei. The 10th Army Group had already conducted major operations in eastern China, including the campaigns for Hokchew, Peng-Tham Island, and Changchew–Amoy. On 15 October, the PLA launched an amphibious operation against Amoy, first conducting a diversionary attack on Kulangsu (Chinese: 鼓浪嶼) to draw away ROC attention. The main force then landed on multiple beaches across Amoy, overcoming the defending ROC troops. On 17 October, General Tang En-Po, acting director of the ROC Pacification Office in Fuzhou, abandoned the city of Amoy. Following the capture of Amoy, the PLA secured positions north of Kinmen, including Greater Tatan, Lesser Tatan, Lienho (Chinese: 蓮河), Shihching (Chinese: 石井), and Aotou (Chinese: 澳頭).

General Yeh Fei then reassigned vessels from the PLA 32nd Army to reinforce the 28th Army, concentrating assets for a seaborne assault on Greater Kinmen. Due to an insufficient number of transport craft, however, the planned crossing was delayed several times. It was not until the evening of 24 October that the final order was given to launch the attack.

The PLA intended to land an initial force of 9,000 troops to establish a beachhead, followed by a second wave of approximately 10,000 reinforcements, expecting to seize the entire island within three days. The PLA operational plan called for landings from the areas around Aotou, Tateng, and Lienho. However, PLA planners significantly underestimated ROC strength, believing Kinmen to be defended by no more than two understrength divisions—roughly 12,000 troops—composed mostly of green recruits and survivors from previous defeats. In reality, ROC strength on the island had been significantly reinforced.

Expecting an imminent assault, ROC commanders had begun constructing defences across the island. By October, ROC troops had laid 7,455 land mines, erected approximately 200 earthen bunkers, and deployed anti-landing beach obstacles. The island garrison included hardened veterans of earlier campaigns, supplemented by elements from the 12th Army. The defensive line at the northern beaches was further strengthened by the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Tank Regiment, consisting of 22 M5A1 Stuart light tanks organised into two companies. These units had prior combat experience in the Burma campaign during the Second World War.

In the early hours of 25 October, the PLA launched its amphibious assault using hundreds of wooden fishing boats. Their aim was to land at Lungkou, the narrowest part of Kinmen. However, strong currents, poor weather, and the rudimentary design of the craft caused many of the vessels to drift off course, with large numbers instead landing further northwest at Kuningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭), where ROC defences were better entrenched.

At the time, Kinmen was home to an estimated 40,000 civilian residents. Despite its small size, the island's close proximity to the mainland rendered it strategically vital. Control of Kinmen enabled command of sea lanes to and from Amoy, making it a critical outpost for the ROC's defensive perimeter during its retreat to Taiwan.

People's Liberation Army

Order of Battle

• 3rd Field Army (Chinese: 第三野戰軍):
  -Commander and Political Commissar: Ch’en I (Chinese: 陳毅)
  -Deputy Commander：Su Yü (Chinese: 粟裕)
  • 10th Corp
    -Commander - Yeh Fei(Chinese: 葉飛)
    -Director of Political Department - Liu Pei-shan (Chinese: 劉培善)
    • 28th Army
      -Commander - Chu Shao-Ching (Chinese: 朱紹清)
      -Deputy Commander and Main Planner of the Attack Plan - Hsiao Feng (Chinese: 蕭鋒)
      -Deputy Political Commissar - Lee Man-Tsun (Chinese: 李曼村)
    • 29th Army
      -Commander - Hu Ping-yün (Chinese: 胡炳雲)
      -Deputy Commander - Tuan Huan-Ching (Chinese: 段煥競)
      -Deputy Political Commissar - Huang Huo-hsing (Chinese: 黃火星)

Preparations for the Campaign

Following rapid advances into Northern and Southern Hokkien, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 10th Army Group had positioned seven armies (the 25th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, and 32nd) along the Fujian front by September–October 1949. However, the PLA lacked experience in naval operations and had no air or naval cover for amphibious assaults. The 10th Army Group planned to seize Greater Kinmen using elements from the 28th and 29th Armies—seven regiments in total—under the command of the 28th Army. Simultaneously, the 31st Army was tasked with capturing Lesser Kinmen.

Nevertheless, since the crossing of the Yangtze River, the PLA’s Third Field Army had not encountered large-scale organised resistance from ROC forces. As a result, no detailed staff planning or training had been conducted for amphibious operations. Most coastal vessels had been destroyed by the Nationalists, and only a limited number of civilian boats had been requisitioned—sufficient to transport just one battalion at a time. Owing to this severe shortage, the plan to involve the 31st Army was cancelled, and it was decided that the 28th Army alone would launch the assault on both Greater and Lesser Kinmen.

PLA intelligence also proved unreliable. During the earlier battle for Greater Tatan and Lesser Tatan, soldiers from the ROC 31st Regiment, 11th Division, 18th Army—part of the 12th Army Group—were captured. PLA 28th Army Deputy Commander Hsiao Feng personally interrogated the prisoners and reported his findings to higher command. However, senior leaders dismissed the intelligence, believing the defending forces were preparing to retreat. Even General Yeh Fei remarked, Impossible. Hu Lien’s army group is still in the Chaozhou–Shantou region and has not yet moved,” adding, “It seems there will be no major battles left on the mainland. Let the 28th Army just wrap things up.

Under repeated urging from the 10th Army Group, the 28th Army finally issued orders for the assault on Greater Kinmen on 18 October. On 21 October, PLA reconnaissance confirmed the arrival of the Nationalist 12th Army Group at Kinmen Bay, having begun maritime transport from Chaozhou and Shantou. By 23 October, the 118th Division had already landed on Greater Kinmen, with follow-on units en route.

Despite these developments, PLA command remained uncertain whether the Nationalists intended to reinforce Kinmen or withdraw to Taiwan. Consequently, no contingency measures were implemented. On 24 October, the 28th Army reported that the assault on Kinmen would commence that night. During a command meeting, General Yeh Fei inquired whether the 12th Army Group had arrived on Kinmen. Staff officers incorrectly replied that the force was still at sea. Based on this assessment, Yeh authorised the operation to begin before Nationalist reinforcements could arrive.

That evening, the PLA’s first echelon—comprising three regiments and over 9,000 troops from the 28th Army—was dispatched for the landing.

PLA's Plan for the Operation

PLA Plan for the Campaign, as drawn by the ROC intelligence services

After the fall of Hokchew to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the PLA 10th Army Group convened a combat planning meeting, deciding to launch the Changchew–Amoy–Kinmen campaign in mid-September 1949. On 19 September, the PLA planned to first seize Changchew. During a follow-up meeting on 26 September regarding operational plans for the Kinmen–Amoy campaign, three options were proposed: "seize Kinmen and Amoy simultaneously", "Amoy first, Kinmen later", and "Kinmen first, Amoy later". After repeated discussions and analysis, General Yeh Fei chose the "simultaneous seizure of Kinmen and Amoy" plan. The 28th Army would be tasked with capturing Kinmen, while the 29th and 31st Armies would focus on Amoy. On 11 October, the East China Field Army replied in agreement, expressing concerns over whether sufficient shipping was available. The message stated that if preparations were complete, both Kinmen and Amoy could be seized simultaneously; otherwise, Amoy should be taken first, followed by Kinmen. The final decision was to be made by the 10th Army Group based on the situation.

On 4 October, the 10th Army Group issued a preliminary combat directive assigning the 31st and 29th Armies to capture Amoy and the 28th Army to capture Kinmen. Due to a severe shortage of vessels, the operational plan was changed from “simultaneous seizure” to “Amoy first, Kinmen later.” Between 10 and 12 October, the 28th Army occupied Greater and Lesser Tatan Islands. The army then deployed along the line from Lien-ho to the Tatans and Shih-ching, maintaining close surveillance of ROC forces on Kinmen. On 17 October, the PLA captured Amoy. After the fall of Amoy, Deputy Commander of the 28th Army, Hsiao Feng, issued an order on 18 October to initiate operations against Kinmen. The assault was scheduled to begin on 20 October, involving six regiments in two echelons. The first echelon would land in three routes:

• The eastern route, led by the 244th Regiment, was to land between Lung-kou (Chinese: 壠口) and Hou-sha (Chinese: 後沙) on Kinmen, quickly advancing to capture Hou-ban Hill (Chinese: 後半山) and Shuang-ju Hill (Chinese: 雙乳山), and establishing control over the midsection of Kinmen from Chiung-lin (Chinese: 瓊林) to Sha-tou (Chinese: 沙頭). This would secure the eastern peninsula and protect the flanks of the 251st and 253rd Regiments during their assault on the county seat.
• The central route, led by the 251st Regiment, was to land between Hsi-pao (Chinese: 西堡) and Kuningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭), rapidly advancing toward the Hu-nan heights (Chinese: 湖南高地) and Pang-lin (Chinese: 榜林) to support the 253rd Regiment in attacking the Kinmen Capital Buildings neighbourhood.
• The western route, led by the 253rd Regiment, was to land at Kuningtou, quickly seize Lin-Tso (Chinese: 林厝) and Pu-tou (Chinese: 埔頭), and proceed with an assault on the county seat, aiming to annihilate ROC forces on the western half of the island.

Following the proposed destruction of ROC forces on the western peninsula, the next phase would involve all three regiments from the first echelon, joined by three more from the second echelon and the 92nd Division in reserve. These forces were to advance from Shuang-ju Hill in two columns, north and south, to encircle and eliminate ROC forces on the eastern peninsula. The entire operation was projected to be completed within three days.

Attack Waves

• First Wave
  • 82nd Division, 244th Regiment of the 28th Army
  • 84th Division, 251st Regiment of the 28th Army
  • 85th Division, 253rd Regiment of the 29th Army
• Second Wave (only 10 platoons actually landed)
  • 82nd Division, 245th Regiment of the 28th Army
  • 82nd Division, 246th Regiment of the 28th Army (2 companies sent for reinforcement)
  • 87th Division, 259th Regiment of the 29th Army (2 companies sent for reinforcement)

Republic of China Armed Forces

Order of Battle

-Chief Executive of the Southeast Military and Political Office: Chen Cheng (Chinese: 陳誠)
-Deputy Chief Executive: Lo Cho-Ying| (Chinese: 羅卓英)
-Acting Director of the Fuchow Pacification Office: Tang En-Po (Chinese: 湯恩伯)

Republic of China Army

ROC soldiers parade through Kinmen following their victory at Guningtou. The Nationalist success marked a critical turning point, halting the PLA’s advance toward Taiwan.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek reviews the victorious tank crews of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Tank Regiment, following the Battle of Kinmen.

• 12th Army Corps (Chinese: 第12兵團)
  -Commander: Hu Lien (Chinese: 胡璉)
  -Deputy Commander: K’o Yüan-fen (Chinese: 柯遠芬)
  -Chief of Staff: Yang Wei-han (Chinese: 楊維翰)
  • Corps Headquarters (Chinese: 第18軍)
  • 18th Army:
    -Commander: Kao Kuei-Yuan (Chinese: 高魁元)
    -Deputy Commanders Liu Ching-jung (Chinese: 劉景蓉), and, Hsiao Jui (Chinese: 蕭銳)
    • 11th Division:
      -Commander: Liu Ting-han (Chinese: 劉鼎漢)
      -Deputy Commander: Chai Lien-yün (Chinese: 翟連運)
      • 31st Regiment – Commander: Chan Yih-Hui (Chinese: 陳以惠), stationed in eastern Kinmen
      • 32nd Regiment – Commander: Wang Ch'eng-hua (Chinese: 王誠華), stationed in eastern Kinmen
      • 33rd Regiment – Commander: Lu Chih-chia (Chinese: 陸志家), stationed on Lesser Kinmen
    • 118th Division (Chinese: 第118師) – Mobile strike force
      -Commander: Lee Shu-lan (Chinese: 李樹蘭)
      • 352nd Regiment – Commander: Tang Chun-Hsien (Chinese: 唐俊賢)
      • 353rd Regiment – Commander: Yang Shu-Tien (Chinese: 楊書田)
      • 354th Regiment – Commander: Lin Shu-Chiao (Chinese: 林書嶠)
  • 19th Army (Chinese: 第19軍)
    -Commander: Liu Yün-Han (Chinese: 劉雲瀚)
    -Deputy Commander: Wu Chui-Kun (Chinese: 吳垂昆)
    • 13th Division (Chinese: 第13師) – Commander: Wu Chui-Kun (Chinese: 吳垂昆), did not engage in combat
      • 37th Regiment – stationed in eastern Kinmen
      • 38th Regiment – stationed in eastern Kinmen
      • 39th Regiment – stationed in Kinmen County seat, served as reserve force
    • 14th Division (Chinese: 第14師)
      -Commander: Lo Hsi-Chou (Chinese: 羅錫疇)
      -stationed in Kinmen County
      • 40th Regiment – Commander: Huang Yü-hsüan (Chinese: 黃煜軒)
        -did not engage in battle; landed post-conflict
      • 41st Regiment – Commander: Liao Hsien-hung (Chinese: 廖先鴻)
      • 42nd Regiment – Commander: Lee Kuang-Chien (Chinese: 李光前)
    • 18th Division (Chinese: 第18師)
      -Commander: Yin Chun (Chinese: 尹俊)
      -stationed in Chinsha
      -missing 53rd Regiment
      • 52nd Regiment – Commander: Sun Chu-chün (Chinese: 孫竹筠)
      • 54th Regiment – Commander: Wen Li-hui (Chinese: 文立徽)
• 22nd Army Corps (Chinese: 第22兵團)

Commander: Lee Liang-jung (Chinese: 李良榮)

• • Army Corps Headquarters
  • 25th Army (Chinese: 第25軍)
    -Commander: Shen Hsiang-k'uei (Chinese: 沈向奎)
    • 40th Division-Commander: Fan Lin (Chinese: 范麟)
    • 45th Division-Commander: Lao Sheng-huan (Chinese: 勞聲寰), stationed at Mt. Taiwu and Chinhu
    • 201st Division, Youth Army (Chinese: 青年軍第201師)
      -Commander: Cheng Kuo (Chinese: 鄭果)
      -Missing 603rd Regiment
      • 601st Regiment – Commander: Lei Kai-Hsüan (Chinese: 雷開瑄), stationed at Kuningtou and Chinning
      • 602nd Regiment – Commander: Foo Yih-Jen (Chinese: 傅伊仁), stationed in western Kinmen and Kincheng
• Independent Units
  • 1st Battalion, 3rd Independent Tank Regiment (Chinese: 獨立戰車第三團第一營)
    -Battalion Commander: Chen Chen-Wei (Chinese: 陳振威)
    -Missing 2nd Company
    • 1st Company – Commander: Hu Ke-Hwa (Chinese: 胡克華)
    • 3rd Company – Commander: Chou Ming-Chin (Chinese: 周名琴), mobile strike unit
  • 7th Company, 3rd Independent Artillery Regiment (Chinese: 獨立砲兵第三團第七連)
  • 1st Company, 14th Independent Artillery Regiment (Chinese: 獨立砲兵第十四團第一連)
  • 3rd Battalion, 20th Independent Engineer Regiment (Chinese: 獨立工兵第二十團第三營)
• 5th Army (Chinese: 第5軍)
  -Commander: Lee Yün-Cheng (李運成)
  -On Lesser Kinmen
  -also known as Liehyü (Chinese: 烈嶼)
  -Did not engage in combat
  • 166th Division – Commander: Yeh Hui-Hsi (Chinese: 葉會西)
  • 200th Division – Commander: Ma Hsin-Chüan (Chinese: 麻心全)

Republic of China Air Force

Republic of China Air Force North American P-51D Mustang fighters based in Taiwan, circa 1949.

Commander-in-Chief: Chou Chih-Jou (Chinese: 周至柔)

• 1st Bomber Group (Chinese: 第一轟炸機大隊)
  • 1st Squadron - North American B-25J Mitchell
  • 3rd Squadron - North American B-25J Mitchell
  • 4th Squadron - North American B-25J Mitchell
• 3rd Pursuit Group (Chinese: 第三戰鬥機大隊)
  • 7th Squadron - North American P-51D/K Mustang
  • 8th Squadron - North American P-51D/K Mustang
• 6th Composite Group (Chinese: 第六混編大隊)
  • 5th Squadron - de Havilland DH.98 Mosquito
• 8th Bomber Group (Chinese: 第一轟炸機大隊)
  - Consolidated B-24M Liberator
• 10th Air Lift Group (Chinese: 第十運輸機大隊)
  - Douglas C-47B Skytrain
• 11th Pursuit Group (Chinese: 第十一戰鬥機大隊)
  - Republic P-47D/N Thunderbolt

Republic of China Navy

Commander-in-Chief: Kuei Yung-ch’ing (Chinese: 桂永清)

• 2nd Fleet
  - Fleet Commander: Lee Yü-hsi (Chinese: 黎玉璽)
  • ROCS Tai Ping F-22 (Chinese: 太平艦)
  • ROCS Chung Yung LST-210 (Chinese: 中榮艦)
  • ROCS Lien-Cheng (Chinese: 聯錚艦)
  • ROCS Chu-Kuan (Chinese: 楚觀艦)
  • ROCS Nan-an (Chinese: 南安)
  • ROCS Huaiyin (Chinese: 淮陰)
  • ASW Boat No. 202 (Chinese: 驅潛二〇二)
  • ASW Boat No. 203 (Chinese: 驅潛二〇三)
  • Gunboat No. 15 (Chinese: 砲十五艇)
  • Gunboat No. 16 (Chinese: 砲十六艇)

Preparations for the Campaign

Map of Troop Deployments by Both Sides

Map of Coastal Mine Placements by the 19th Army of the Republic of China Army

Before June 1949 (38th year of the Republic), the Republic of China (ROC) had established no defences on Kinmen (Quemoy) Island. It was only by mid-June that the Amoy Fortress Command (Chinese: 廈門要塞司令部) formally established the Kinmen Fortress Headquarters (Chinese: 金門要塞總台) and began constructing fortifications and laying communication lines. The eastern region of Greater Kinmen featured high cliffs, making landings difficult, whereas the western region was relatively flat, with the northern shore consisting of sandy beaches suitable for amphibious landings—hence the primary focus of ROC defensive preparations.

Apart from a few existing Japanese-built fortifications, new field defences and obstacles were installed along potential landing zones. The island’s initial garrison included the entire 22nd Army Group, the Youth Army’s 201st Division, and the 11th Division of the 12th Army Group, totalling over 20,000 troops. In order to strengthen Kinmen’s defences, the 18th and 19th Armies under the 12th Army Group were gradually redeployed from the Teochew–Swatow (Chinese: 潮汕) area after 10 October. By 24 October, ROC troop strength on Kinmen had increased to over 40,000.

On 17 August, following the fall of Hokchew, General Tang En-Po withdrew to Amoy. Liu Ju-ming, commander of the 8th Army Group, was tasked with defending the Changchew–Amoy (Chinese: 漳廈) sector, while Lee Liang-Jung, commander of the 22nd Army Group, handed over the Amoy Garrison to Mao Sen and redeployed to Kinmen. On 19 August, after the 7th Army Group took over defensive responsibilities in Amoy, the 25th Army (commanded by Shen Hsiang-Kuei, with the 45th Division under Lao Sheng-Huan and the 40th Division under Fan Lin) arrived on Kinmen. The 22nd Army Group completed its redeployment to Greater and Lesser Kinmen by 25 August.

On 3 September, the 201st Division of the 80th Army—reorganised from the Independent 1st Brigade in September 1948, and commanded by Cheng Kuo—was transferred to Kinmen from Taiwan, where it had been trained under General Sun Li-jen in Fongshan, Taiwan. The division’s 601st and 602nd Regiments, totalling over 3,000 men, were deployed to the island. (The 603rd Regiment had previously been sent to Ma-wei in Hokkien to reinforce the Hokchew campaign and was subsequently lost.) Later, the 1st Battalion (excluding the 2nd Company) of the 3rd Armoured Regiment, with 21 M5A1 light tanks, was also deployed to Kinmen. The final major reinforcement arrived on 8 October, when the 18th Army (commanded by Kao Kuei-Yuan, with the 11th Division under Liu Ting-Han, 43rd Division under Pao Pu-Ch’ao, and 118th Division under Li Shu-Lan) was transported from Swatow.

The 22nd Army Group Headquarters, the 45th and 201st Divisions, the 3rd Armoured Regiment, and units of the 12th Army Group were deployed across Greater Kinmen, while the 40th Division was assigned to the defence of Ta-teng and Hsiao-teng Islands.

On Greater Kinmen, the 601st Regiment held the northern sector around Kuningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭), while the 602nd Regiment was stationed in the west. The two regiments formed a defensive line stretching between Chiunglin (Chinese: 瓊林) and Kuningtou. Although defensive earthworks and bunkers were constructed upon arrival, limited access to building materials meant that many positions were built from simple earthen mounds. Timber and other supplies were requisitioned locally to support construction.

On 11 September, Lo Cho-Ying, Deputy Chief of the ROC Southeastern Military and Political Office, accompanied Chief Chen Cheng on an inspection of Amoy and later travelled to Swatow to meet with Fang Tien and General Hu Lien, before returning to Taipei on 12 September. In mid-September, the 5th Army, though understrength with only the 200th Division remaining, was returned to the 22nd Army Group and assigned to garrison Lesser Kinmen.

By October, with much of northern Hokkien under Communist control and the loss of Changchew, pressure on southern Hokkien intensified. Although the 22nd Army Group included multiple divisions and support elements on paper, many units remained under-equipped. In response, Chen Cheng tasked Lo Cho-Ying with arranging the redeployment of the 12th Army Group to Kinmen.

Originally operating in the Canton theatre, the 12th Army Group’s 18th and 19th Armies had conducted recruitment and reorganisation efforts during their retreat through Chekiang and Kiangsi following the Battle of Hsupeng. After crossing into southern China in May 1949, General Hu Lien oversaw the reassembly of these forces using a regional recruitment strategy. By the time they reached Teochew–Swatow, the 12th Army Group was reported to have reached a strength of approximately 100,000 troops.

On 8 October, Kao Kuei-Yuan led his forces from Swatow to Kinmen by sea. On 10 October, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched attacks on Greater Tatan and Lesser Tatan. These were garrisoned by the 40th Division with support from the 11th Division. Despite resistance, the islands were lost and remaining ROC forces withdrew to Kinmen. ROC commanders now recognised Kinmen and Amoy as the next likely battlegrounds.

On 10 and 14 October, the ROC transferred additional units to Kinmen, including the 18th Army (11th, 118th, and 43rd Divisions—although the 43rd Division did not participate in the Battle of Kuningtou) and the 19th Army (13th, 14th, and 18th Divisions). By 24 October, total ROC strength on Kinmen exceeded 40,000. The 19th Army, originally designated for the Chekiang front, was redirected to Kinmen by order of the Southeastern Office on 19 October. Until the full arrival of the 12th Army Group, operational command of the island remained with Lee Liang-Jung.

In addition to ground reinforcements, the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) launched aerial attacks from October onward against PLA shipping between Amoy and Kinmen. On 18 October, ROCAF aircraft conducted a major operation targeting a PLA landing exercise near Amoy, destroying hundreds of motorised junks and hindering the PLA’s amphibious transport capacity.

According to General Wang Hung-Kuang, Deputy Commander of the PLA’s Nanjing Military Region, ROC troop strength on Greater and Lesser Kinmen during the campaign was approximately 60,000. However, many units were understrength. Of these, only around 20,000 troops were deemed combat effective, with about 10,000 concentrated in the western half of Greater Kinmen—the area where the main battle would unfold.

The Actual Battle

25 October 1949

Battle Unfolds

Stuart M5A1 Tank "Miss Mary Lynn" repainted with the livery of the Tank No. 66, and the men dressed in light blue on the right of the picture is gunner Hsiung Chen-Chiu, participating in the 65th Anniversary of the Battle of Kuningtou.

At approximately 00:00 on October 25, a forward sentry officer from the 1st Battalion, 601st Regiment of the 201st Division (ROC Army) accidentally detonated a landmine. This incident led defenders stationed on the western peninsula of Kinmen to believe that a PLA assault was imminent. ROC defensive positions were rapidly manned, and searchlights—dubbed the "East-West Scarlet Beams"—were activated. These lights exposed an advancing detachment of the PLA 44th Regiment attempting a surprise landing, triggering immediate exchanges of gunfire.

By 00:30, three M5A1 Stuart tanks of the 3rd Tank Regiment’s 1st Battalion, 1st Company, stationed near Lung-kou (Chinese: 壠口), observed two red flares launched from the sea. They soon came under heavy fire from PLA wooden vessels and shore-mounted machine guns. The tank crews swiftly assumed combat positions and returned fire, thus commencing what would become known as the Battle of Kinmen.

A notable early exchange involved M5A1 Stuart Tank No. 66, which had been immobilised with its turret facing inland. In a moment of instinct, the recruit gunner Hsiung Chen-Chiu (Chinese: 熊震球) mistakenly loaded an armour-piercing round rather than a high-explosive shell. As gunner Hsiung pressed the pedal trigger, the projectile struck the mast of a PLA junk, setting its canvas ablaze and illuminating nearby targets. ROC defenders opened fire with coastal guns, including twelve 57 mm Ordnance QF 6-pounder anti-tank guns, M2 mortars, and four 75 mm M116 howitzers supplied by the United States. According to reported accounts, an ammunition ship was one of the first hit by ROC tank fire, resulting in a fire that burned neighboring landing craft.

Escalation and PLA Landings

By 01:30, over 300 wooden PLA landing boats surged forward in a major assault. ROC Tank No. 66's full crew, including Platoon Leader Yang Chan (Chinese: 楊展), Sergeant Tang Tsai-Kun (Chinese: 唐在坤), Assistant Driver Tseng Shao-Lin (Chinese: 曾紹林), Technician Ou Hsiao-Yün (Chinese: 歐曉雲), and Reservist Yao Pu-Hsiung (Chinese: 姚步雄), were all actively engaged. At dawn, the PLA renewed its focus on Tank No. 66 and ROC's 602nd Regiment. Assistant Driver Tseng was killed during intense close-quarters fighting while manning an M1919 .30 calibre machine gun.

At 02:10, PLA artillery stationed at Tapo (Chinese: 大伯), Hsiaopo (Chinese: 小伯), Chiao-hsü (Chinese: 角嶼), and Ta-Hsiaoteng (Chinese: 大小嶝) commenced bombardment of ROC positions across Kuan-ao (Chinese: 官澳), Hsi-yüan (Chinese: 西園), Guanyin Pavilion Hill (Chinese: 觀音亭山) and Kuningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭). However, the 75 mm IJA Type 41 mountain guns and captured 105 mm M101 howitzers of the PLA artillery troops, proved insufficient in range and firepower to provide meaningful support to ground units.

PLA troops made landings along a 10-kilometre stretch from Lung-kou (Chinese: 壠口), Hou-sha (Chinese: 後沙) to Kuningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭). The 244th Regiment came ashore between Lan-Tso (Chinese: 蘭厝) and Lung-kou, while the vanguard of the 251st Regiment reached Hu-wei (Chinese: 湖尾鄉). However, subsequent elements of the 251st were struck by artillery, resulting in heavy casualties—approximately one-third of their force.

Lacking unified command and operating under a doctrine of aggressive forward movement, PLA units pushed inland without consolidating their positions. According to captured PLA medic Chao Pao-Hou (Chinese: 趙保厚), the PLA 244th Regiment suffered significant losses under ROC fire before they could entrench.

ROC Counterattack and Naval Movements

ROCS Chung Yung

At dawn, Commander Liu T’ien-hsiang (Chinese: 劉天祥) of the PLA 251st Regiment reported optimism to Deputy Commander Hsiao Feng (Chinese: 蕭鋒) of the PLA 28th Army, noting that ROC Youth Army units at Kuningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭) appeared weak and that numerous prisoners had been taken, some only wearing undergarments. PLA General Yeh Fei (Chinese: 葉飛), based on these reports, believed a PLA victory was imminent.

Simultaneously, ROC Navy vessels moved to intercept the PLA landing fleet. Among them were Minesweeper No. 202, gunboats ROCS Nan An and ROCS Huai Yin, and the tank landing ship ROCS Chung Yung. The latter, originally headed to Tinghai in Chekiang for illicit sugar trade, was reassigned to transport ROC's 19th Army. Due to delays and poor weather, ROCS Chung Yung remained near Kinmen and participated in the engagement using Bofors 40 mm and 20 mm autocannons against wooden boats.

At 04:30, the ROC 18th Army’s 118th Division (less the 352nd Regiment) joined with garrison forces to launch a three-pronged counterattack. The 14th Division, minus the 40th Regiment, advanced from Hou-Pu (Chinese: 後埔) under coordinated efforts by Generals Liu Yün-Han (Chinese: 劉雲瀚) and Shen Hsiang-Kuei (Chinese: 沈向奎). Mortar units from the 40th Division provided fire support, while reserve tank platoons were held at Chiung-lin.

Air Superiority and Joint Operations

Republic of China Air Force P-51 Mustangs lined up. During the Battle of Guningtou, these aircraft conducted ground attack missions against PLA landing forces, contributing significantly to the Nationalist victory.

At 08:00, the ROCAF commenced sustained bombing and strafing operations against PLA forces and abandoned vessels. By dusk, the command staff of the 12th Army Group had arrived off southern Kinmen aboard the MV Min Yü (Chinese: 民裕輪), where General Hu Lien was waiting ashore. However, unfamiliarity with the coastline and rough seas prevented the staff from disembarking immediately.

Of the three PLA regiments that landed on day one, only one battalion on the western shore was not where intended. At daybreak, the PLA troops—now fully exposed—faced heavy, coordinated ROC attacks from air, land, and sea. Notably, the ROC Army’s 45th Division, formerly a security unit of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force during the 2nd Sino Japanese War, was outfitted with advanced air liaison systems, Besides the division commander, Lao Sheng-huan (Chinese: 勞聲寰), many of his subordinate officers were also trained as Forward Air Controllers. Commander Lao successfully coordinated with 18 ROCAF P-51 Mustang fighter aircraft from Taiwan, and his FAC team directed them to target PLA boats. Over 100 PLA landing craft were destroyed in what became a rare and effective tri-service operation during the Chinese Civil War.

Collapse of the PLA Landing Effort

As PLA vessels were caught in shallow waters due to low tide, they became easy targets for ROC air and naval forces. No second wave reinforcements ever made it ashore. Colonel Hsing Yung-sheng (Chinese: 邢永生) of the PLA 244th Regiment, although gravely wounded, continued to lead his unit until it was nearly annihilated by noon.

The PLA 253rd Regiment was pushed back from Kuan-yin Hill and Hu-wei Heights, and Colonel Liu T’ien-hsiang of the PLA 251st Regiment fought until 15:00, incurring roughly 1,000 casualties. Some surviving troops regrouped with the 253rd at Kuningtou. A detachment of the 251st Regiment held their ground through seven ROC assaults before retreating. The 253rd Regiment also resisted multiple counterattacks.

ROC Army Colonel Lee Kuang-Chien (Chinese: 李光前) of the ROC 42nd Regiment, 14th Division, was killed while leading an assault on Lintsu (Chinese: 林厝).

Realising the dire situation, PLA’s 10th Army Group attempted to send reinforcements, but could only gather enough transport for four companies. Due to ROC’s overwhelming control of the air and sea, additional reinforcements were deemed impossible.

26 October 1949

At approximately 03:00 on 26 October, an estimated 1,000 troops—comprising four companies from the PLA 246th Regiment and elements of the PLA 85th Division—attempted a second wave of landings at Hu-wei and Kuningtou to reinforce embattled PLA units already ashore. However, heavy winds and choppy seas dispersed the landing craft, and only ten platoons successfully made landfall. Their approach was compromised by frequent illumination flare drops from ROCAF C-47 transport aircraft throughout the night, significantly diminishing the PLA’s advantage in stealthy night operations.

The reinforcements were detected before reaching the shore and immediately came under ROC fire. Forced into disorganised mobile combat, they fought while withdrawing inland. At dawn, the surviving companies of the PLA 246th Regiment managed to break through ROC encirclement and linked up with PLA troops still holding out in the town of Kuningtou.

At 06:30, the ROC 118th Division launched a coordinated counteroffensive from the northern coastline at Pu-t’ou toward PLA positions around Lintsu and Kuningtou. Urban fighting quickly erupted in the narrow streets and alleyways of Kuningtou, leading to intense house-to-house combat. Despite fierce resistance, ROC troops, supported by P-47 fighter-bombers and B-24 heavy bombers of the ROC Air Force, retook Lintsu by midday and Nanshan (Chinese: 南山) by 15:00. Remaining PLA forces began retreating to the northern coastline but were unable to locate boats and instead attempted to escape into the mountainous southeast.

Meanwhile, at 10:00, General Hu Lien arrived at Shui-t’ou (Chinese: 水頭) pier between Greater and Lesser Kinmen aboard a tank landing ship. After meeting with senior commanders including Tang En-Po and Lo Cho-Ying, Hu proceeded to the Hu-nan Heights (Chinese: 湖南高地) to oversee deployment adjustments. Learning the gravity of the situation from General Kao Kuei-Yuan (Chinese: 高魁元) —then leading combat on the front—Hu Lien assumed direct command of the ROC 118th and 25th Armies without delay. He personally coordinated with the commanders of the ROC 54th, 352nd, 353rd, and 354th Regiments, reinvigorating frontline morale. By nightfall, ROC forces had completed an encirclement of Kuningtou Village.

The ROC 118th Division’s commander, Major General Lee Shu-lan (Chinese: 李樹蘭), reorganised the assault by assigning the ROC 353rd Regiment to relieve the ROC 352nd Regiment. Supported by tanks, the ROC forces pushed further into Kuningtou. The battle continued into the night, culminating around 22:00 when PLA remnants attempted a breakout under the cover of darkness. Unable to locate evacuation vessels, they turned inland toward the mountainous terrain to the southeast.

27 October 1949

By the early morning of 27 October, surviving People's Liberation Army forces had exhausted their food and ammunition supplies. Over 1,300 troops, many of whom had landed the previous day as reinforcements, retreated to the beaches beneath the cliffs north of Kuningtou. At around midnight, they were discovered by Republic of China forces, who launched a concentrated four-hour assault. More than 400 PLA soldiers were killed, and the remaining 900 surrendered en masse by 10:00.

Despite the collapse of the main PLA force, additional reinforcements continued to arrive. At 03:00, a motor launch carrying around 30 men from the 3rd Company, 259th Regiment of the PLA, landed on the northern shore, but all were promptly captured. That morning, ROC forces had already secured Kuningtou village, but further PLA units—stranded from the previous night’s failed reinforcement attempt—were found hiding along the northern coast and also surrendered after being ordered to lay down arms.

At 09:30, Major General Li Shu-lan reported the complete success directly to General Hu Lien. Later that day, the ROC Southeast Military and Political Director Chen Cheng arrived at Kinmen by air, conducted an inspection of Kinmen and visited the front lines. While returning, his convoy encountered over 100 PLA troops who emerged from trenches and surrendered in orderly fashion.

By the afternoon, remaining PLA units near Shuang-ju Hill (Chinese: 雙乳山) were surrounded and forced to surrender. This engagement, occurring at approximately 16:00, marked the end of major combat operations on Kinmen.

28 October 1949

The battle officially concluded on 28 October as remaining PLA forces, having exhausted all resources, surrendered or were captured. Colonel Sun Yuxiu (Chinese: 孫玉秀) of the PLA 246th Regiment was wounded and committed suicide. Sporadic fighting continued briefly, but resistance had effectively ended. Colonel Xu Bo (Chinese: 徐博) of the PLA 253rd Regiment, who had fled into the mountains, was not discovered until January 1950. He was captured and later executed in Taiwan.

Aftermath

Battle of Guningtou memorial arch

The defeat at Kuningtou marked a significant setback for the People's Liberation Army. In the aftermath, PLA General Yeh Fei submitted a written apology to Mao Tse-Tung, accepting responsibility for the failure and requesting punishment. Ye attributed the defeat to three main factors: the shortage of landing vessels, the inability to properly secure beachheads, and the absence of a unified command overseeing the three regiments in the initial landing wave. However, as Ye was one of Mao's most trusted and favoured generals, no disciplinary action was taken against him.

For the Republic of China (ROC) forces—accustomed to a series of defeats during the Chinese Civil War—the victory at Kuningtou provided a crucial morale boost. Strategically, the battle halted the PLA’s momentum toward an invasion of Taiwan. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and the subsequent signing of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, the Communist Party’s plans for invading Taiwan were indefinitely postponed.

In the People’s Republic of China, the Battle of Kuningtou received limited public attention for decades. It was not until the early 21st century that the battle began to receive wider acknowledgement in the mainland, when articles analysing the reasons for the defeat were published more openly. Military analysts cited several contributing factors: lack of experience in amphibious operations, inadequate landing craft, absence of armoured support, weak defensive capabilities, insufficient intelligence services, and a general lack of international recognition.

Additionally, the PLA had anticipated a swift victory within a single day of fighting and therefore failed to supply the first wave with sufficient ammunition, rations, and water. This logistical shortfall persisted, albeit to a lesser extent, during the second day of combat operations.

In Taiwan, the battle is regarded as a turning point and foundational event shaping the modern status quo between Taiwan and mainland China.

Republic of China Casualties

The ROC Southeast Military and Political Office held a press conference stating that ROC casualties were fewer than 3,000. According to official ROC military history, the ROC suffered 1,267 killed and 1,982 wounded, for a total of 3,249 casualties. The highest-ranking officer killed in action was Colonel Lee Kuang-Chien, commander of the 42nd Regiment, 14th Division, under the 19th Army.

Regarding the number of ROC troops killed in action, the official PLA battle report included a significantly exaggerated claim. According to PLA military records, "more than 9,000 ROC troops were killed or wounded during the fighting on Kinmen."

People's Liberation Army Casualties

The Battle of Kuningtou saw three waves of amphibious assaults by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Of the 9,086 troops landed (including the 350 non-combat personnel), the PLA also claimed: "the vast majority were killed in action", marking one of the most significant losses for the PLA during the Second Chinese Civil War.

• The first wave, on the night of 24 October, included the 244th Regiment of the 82nd Division and the 251st Regiment of the 84th Division, both under the PLA 28th Army, as well as the 253rd Regiment of the 85th Division under the 29th Army, and the 3rd Battalion of the 246th Regiment (82nd Division). Altogether, this force comprised ten full infantry battalions.

• The second wave, which landed on the night of 25 October, included the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion of the 246th Regiment, two machine-gun and artillery platoons, and over thirty hand-picked combat veterans drawn from the same regiment—totalling more than 300 personnel. It also involved over 200 troops from the 3rd Battalion of the 259th Regiment, 87th Division (29th Army), though only around 100 of them successfully reached the island.

• The third wave arrived on the night of 26 October and consisted of more than 30 troops from the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion, 259th Regiment. Their primary mission was to assist in evacuating wounded personnel from the battlefield. In total, 9,086 personnel took part in the operation, including approximately 350 boat operators and civilian porters.

The Chinese Communist Party has long maintained that, of the 9,086-men landing force, aside from a small number of troops taken prisoner, nearly all of the majority "perished heroically" in battle.

On the other hand, the Republic of China’s official records assert that a total of 3,873 PLA officers and enlisted personnel were killed during the fighting on Kinmen.

The true figure remains disputed, reflecting the broader political divide and conflicting wartime narratives between the two sides.

People's Liberation Army Prisoners of War

Captured PLA soldiers from the Battle of Guningtou being processed by ROC forces. Over 7,000 PLA troops were taken prisoner following the failed Communist landing operation.

According to records from the Republic of China (ROC) military, a total of 7,364 People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops were captured during the Battle of Kuningtou. Specific figures included 1,495 captured by the 201st Division, 3,204 by the 118th Division, 735 by the 11th Division, 995 by the 18th Division, and 935 by the 14th Division. In his memoir Recollections of Kinmen, General Hu Lien further claimed that more than 1,000 of those captured were civilian boatmen and porters.

Among the captured personnel, civilian non-combatants—including boatmen and porters—were typically given the option of returning to mainland China or settling in Taiwan or on Kinmen. Those who remained often found employment in Taiwan's fishing industry.

In some cases, captured PLA soldiers were discovered to have previously served in the ROC Armed Forces, particularly those who had voluntarily joined the Nationalist forces during earlier mainland campaigns but were later captured and conscripted into the PLA. If their former unit could be verified or they were personally recognised by ROC officers, they were promptly reintegrated into active service between 25 and 27 October 1949 to replace battle casualties. These individuals bypassed the Rehabilitation Camp process entirely and continued to serve in their original or assigned units until discharge.

In contrast, a large number of captured PLA personnel had no prior service with the ROC military. Additionally, there were captives who had previously been forcibly conscripted into the Nationalist forces on the mainland by press gangs, before subsequently joining the PLA following their capture. In most cases, their original identities could not be verified by the ROC forces.

As a result, the majority of able-bodied or lightly wounded PLA combat personnel were interned at the Kan-ch’eng Barracks (Chinese: 干城營房) in Taichung. After several months of training in Rehabilitation Camps (Chinese: 新生訓練營), they were formally reassigned and integrated into the ROC Armed Forces. Some senior PLA officers, such as Liu Tien-hsiang, commander of the 251st Regiment, were reportedly flown to Taiwan aboard ROCAF aircraft. According to some accounts, Liu later died during a hunger strike.

Over 900 older PLA officers and those seriously wounded were repatriated to mainland China in 1950. However, those repatriated to the mainland often faced political persecution. Owing to their status as former POWs, many were treated unjustly by the newly established People's Republic of China; a few were even executed. It was not until after the period of economic reform and opening-up that their reputations were officially rehabilitated.

Conversely, a number of those who remained in Taiwan also experienced discrimination due to their past service in the PLA. They faced limited social mobility in the early decades following the war. Yet, in the years after the implementation of the Three Links and increased cross-strait exchanges, some of these former POWs who had settled in Taiwan returned to mainland China as businessmen. In several cases, they were embraced by Mainland Chinese authorities for their symbolic value in promoting reunification efforts. A few even became members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) after relocating to the mainland.

Legacy

Depiction of the Battle of Guningtou (October 1949), showing Nationalist forces repelling waves of PLA troops amid heavy artillery fire. The defense featured intense close-quarter combat and tank support from ROC M5A1 Stuart tanks.

In 1984, the soldiers who fought and fell during the battle were formally commemorated with the establishment of the Kuningtou Battle Museum. The M5A1 tanks used in the conflict were preserved and placed on display outside the museum as part of the memorial.

In Taiwan, the battle became popularly known as the "Great Victory at Kuningtou" (Chinese: 古寧頭大捷; pinyin: Gǔ níng tóu dàjié). Interpretations of the battle's significance have evolved over time. Government publications and academic studies frequently credited the outcome to Chiang Kai-shek’s strategic foresight and the Kuomintang’s military preparedness. While many accounts acknowledge tactical missteps by the PLA, recent perspectives also highlight the role of unexpected events—such as the accidental detonation of a landmine and the sudden reactivation of a stalled tank—as pivotal factors in the ROC's success.

Despite differing narratives, most analyses concur in viewing the battle as a testament to the importance of readiness, cohesion, and tactical flexibility in warfare.

The Bear of Kinmen

ROC M5A1 tank with placard reading "The Bear of Kinmen"

The M5A1 light tanks deployed by ROC forces on Kinmen played a decisive role in countering the initial human wave attacks launched by PLA infantry during the landings. In several instances, ROC tank crews, having expended all available ammunition, used their vehicles as makeshift road rollers, crushing attacking PLA troops at close range.

The effectiveness and resilience demonstrated by these tanks led ROC troops to nickname the M5A1 the **"Bear of Kinmen"** (Chinese: 金門之熊). Among the most notable engagements occurred at Lungkou (Chinese: 壟口), where the PLA’s 244th Regiment came ashore and encountered three tanks—#64, #65, and #66—of the 1st Platoon, 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, ROC 3rd Tank Regiment. Notably, Tank #66 had broken down on the beach the previous evening during company exercises. The remaining two tanks were ordered to remain in place and provide protection until repairs could be completed.

See also

• Retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan
• Outline of the Chinese Civil War
• Outline of the military history of the People's Republic of China
• National Revolutionary Army
• History of the People's Liberation Army
• Kuningtou War Museum

References

Sources

• Liu (劉), Fengwu (鳳舞). "41". 《民國春秋》 [Spring and Autumn in the Republic] (in Chinese). Archived from the original on March 2, 2006. Retrieved March 5, 2006.

External links

• Battlefield Monuments at Kinmen National Park
• Interactive map of Kinmen from the Kinmen County Government